Abstract: Due to a wide range of attacks possible on the internet, abundance of security solutions exists in the market today. In spite of this, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is still considered irrepressible, as none of the present-day solutions seems to completely eradicate its existence. The most sophisticated form of this attack, application-layer DDoS attack, is on the rise seeking to its surging frequency in recent years. With a primary focus on their detection and mitigation, the researchers have made significant contributions toward the related literature. We begin with introducing application-layer DDoS attacks followed by an analysis of the recent contributions in a nutshell. Subsequently, the underlying mechanism behind the application-layer DDoS attacks is discussed to apprehend its effect on traditional web server architecture. Finally, two independent exhaustive simulations are carried out to evaluate the impact of such attacks on the performance of a web server from multiple perspectives. Multifarious experimental designs corresponding to different attack intensities and server performance parameters are exercised during our first simulation scenario in order to report diverse possible scenarios. The second simulation scenario examines three well-known application-layer DDoS attack strategies that an attacker usually adopts in order to instigate an application-layer DDoS attack.
Introduction
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks have greatly influenced the online communities that financially rely on the continuous availability of their services to the users. The primary attacking strategy followed by these attacks includes flooding the target with an enormous amount of unsolicited packets (Mirkovic and Reiher, 2004) . The ease in accessing and operating the attack tools has uplifted the incidents pertaining to DDoS attacks. Although the majority of DDoS attacks are much smaller in amplitude, the recent years have seen some high amplitude attacks as well (Arbor Networks, 2015) . This confirms the presence of a gigantic number of bots that at any moment can completely thwart the functioning of online services. There has been a sharp increase in the number, as well as the amplitude, of DDoS attacks since the year 2013. Especially higher bandwidth DDoS attacks are on the rise, as shown in Figure 1 (Akamai, 2015) . According to a recent survey (Neustar, 2012) , a complete day under DDoS attack can cause $240,000 loss of the revenue to an organisation. During the fourth quarter of the year 2014, Xbox Live and Steam were targeted costing them a fortune of revenue (Hannley, 2014) . 
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Undergoing a continuous evolution, traditional DoS attacks have shaped to a much bigger, faster and sophisticated DDoS attacks. Application-layer DDoS (apDDoS) attacks are soaring as a new-fangled form of the traditional denial of service attacks these days (Kostadinov, 2013) . Their strength lies in exploiting various configuration and functional vulnerabilities of the application layer services and protocols (Sachdeva et al., 2010) . The effectiveness of these attacks can be attributed to the fact that many state-of-the-art defence mechanisms have proved to be insufficient in handling these attacks. The attackers make use of highly sophisticated bots in order to launch an apDDoS attacks. The traffic generated by these bots is in proximity to the legitimate traffic in terms of access patterns, connection establishment, etc. As a result, it becomes extremely cumbersome for the defense mechanisms to actually distinguish between legitimate and attack traffic.
Ranging from marketing to education, the online services have gained immense popularity in recent years. This necessitates a profound understanding of working and impact of apDDoS attacks on the availability of these services. The current literature on impact analysis of apDDoS attacks using simulation typically sends a continuous stream of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets over the network toward the victim, which only exhausts its lower layer resources. This kind of attack packet stream is generally handled by lower layer equipment like firewalls, intrusion detection systems, etc., leaving application layer server resources unaffected by its implications. In an apDDoS attack, bots establish two-way Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection with the server over which they send legitimate looking requests to the server. When sent at a rate beyond a threshold, these requests easily saturate the server's request queue, leading to subsequent request drops.
The major contribution of this paper is three-fold. Firstly, we generate attack traffic using modified Webtraf module in Network Simulator 2 (Issariyakul and Hossain, 2008) to closely mimic the legitimate access behaviour. Secondly, we analyse the attack impact with varying server processing rates and queue lengths. Thirdly, we generate different forms of apDDoS attack such as pulsating, asymmetric and slowly increasing attacks to measure their impact on the performance of a web server. A comprehensive analysis of the impact of apDDoS attacks presented in this work will also assist future research in the area of defence against such attacks. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on apDDoS attacks along with the related work. Section 3 portrays the effect of apDDoS attacks on traditional web server architecture. Section 4 explores various attack parameters and simulation topology associated with the experimental setup. Section 5 discusses the simulation results. We summarise our work in Section 6.
apDDoS attacks
Recent trends have shown a radical shift from the traditional bandwidth level DDoS attacks toward more sophisticated and organised ways of exploiting individual applications deployed on the internet. These attacks, also known as apDDoS attacks, continue to have the potential of evading many of the present day detection solutions like IP traceback (Singh et al., 2016) . Unlike a traditional DDoS attack that relies on exhausting the network resources, an apDDoS attack targets the higher layer vulnerabilities. On the top of that, these attacks carry forward the same level of impact with higher sophistication and accuracy. The increase in frequency of higher layer DDoS attacks is reflected in the fact that protocols like HTTP, VOIP, SMTP, etc. are becoming the primary targets of DDoS attacks these days (Kostadinov, 2013) .
ApDDoS attacks take advantage of the vulnerabilities of application layer protocols and its configurations. These attacks can broadly be classified into:
• High rate -The objects are requested at a much higher rate than the server could handle. This leads to dropping of subsequent incoming requests of legitimate clients.
• High workload -The request rate lies in the normal range but the requested objects are large enough to keep the server busy in processing.
• Exploit -The attackers exploit various configuration-based vulnerabilities of the services running on the application-layer.
Attack traffic from apDDoS bots consists of legitimate looking requests that remain undetectable at lower layers. The apDDoS attack traffic exhibits legitimate behaviour, which makes it necessary for the server to employ dedicated detection mechanisms for continuous monitoring of the incoming requests. ApDDoS attacks are more threatening than other lower level DDoS attacks because they require far less number of resources to launch a high impact attack. These attacks can produce much greater damage with the same number of bots as compared to other DDoS attacks. Only a few attacking resources could easily consume all the victim's application layer resources.
Application-layer performance metrics
HTTP communication is structured in the form of request/response sequences. A request and its corresponding response are considered as a complete transaction. A single TCP connection may span across a number of transactions between a client and the server. A user session spreads over multiple TCP connections i.e., multiple connections can be established and terminated during a single session. Different web pages requested by the client share single-session attribute. The size of a web page relates to the number and type of objects constituting that web page, as every object can be of different size like image, video, etc.
To analyse the impact of apDDoS attack on legitimate users, we used the following metrics defined in by Bhandari et al. (2014): 1 Transactions: It represents the total number of successful transactions i.e., the count of transactions completed before it reaches the timeout.
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2 Elapsed time: This is measured from the time a simulation is initiated until the last simulated user completes its transactions.
3 Transaction rate: It is the average number of transactions the server handles per second.
Total number of transactions Total simulation duration seconds
4 Failed transactions: The count of the total number of failed transactions that responded with an error code.
5 Longest transaction: The duration of the longest request response delay among all successful transactions.
6 Shortest transaction: The duration of the shortest request response delay among all transactions.
7 Percentage of failed transactions: A transaction is considered as failed when the response is not received during a specific threshold value (commonly known as response timeout). The percentage of failed transactions monitors the rate of transaction failure during a client-server communication.
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8 Average latency: It is the average of the time intervals between an HTTP request and its corresponding first received response. This attribute reflects the congestion at the web server.
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where T resp and T req represents the time of request generated and its first response received respectively.
Related work
The attack detection techniques can be classified into two broad categories namely, anomaly-based and signature-based. Anomaly-based detection techniques rely on the trained traffic behaviour features to identify the presence of attack streams. The literature addressing detection of DDoS attacks predominately follows anomaly-based approach (Aziz et al., 2013a (Aziz et al., , 2013b (Aziz et al., , 2014 Eid et al., 2013) . The signature-based detection techniques, on the other hand, continuously monitor traffic for known attack patterns. Some recent works that have addressed the problem of detecting apDDoS attacks are discussed below. Das et al. (2011) identified multiple apDDoS attacks using three different detection modules. The values of HTTP request arrival rates calculated in an HTTP window signal the presence of one of the given scenarios-random flooding, shrew flooding or flash crowd. The detection accuracy is influenced by the presence of web proxies and caches. Additionally, a stealthy attacker can easily defy the proposed detection logic.
Ankali and Ashoka (2011) proposed two attack detection mechanisms for HTTP and FTP based on HsMM. They extracted various features like request rate, page viewing time and requested sequence to model legitimate behaviour. The complete system consists of three modules: login, anomaly detection and prevention. Initially, a user is offered access to the resources only if it is having a valid username and password. Second module identifies behaviour anomalies (if any) in a user session. Finally, the attack is prevented by blocking the service to suspected users. Choi et al. (2011) proposed a detection mechanism that uses a support vector machine to classify normal and attack traffic. The detection is built on the traffic characteristics collected during a specified monitoring period. This monitoring period is divided into a number of time slots during which only a single HTTP GET request is allowed to be served. The normal and attack profiles are modelled using parameters extracted from each time slot in a single monitoring period. Yu et al. (2012) assumed the network traffic to possess a strong similarity/correlation. The authors give the theoretical proof of the discrimination algorithm used to identify similarities among suspicious flows. The flow correlation coefficient is used to differentiate a flash crowd from apDDoS attacks. However, this system overloads the server by introducing complex computational efforts, which bound its implementation in real time scenarios. Ye et al. (2012) proposed time and sequence independent hierarchical clustering-based detection scheme to differentiate a legitimate and suspicious browsing behaviour. They used four separate user session features: object size, request rate, object popularity and transition probability. Despite that, the detection scheme fails to identify attack traces in case of flash crowds.
Sivabalan and Radcliffe (2013) proposed a detection system in which the server load level is divided into three parts using two threshold values: low load threshold and high load threshold. Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHAs) and Are You A Human (AYAHs) are occasionally generated during a session to create user signatures before and during a session. Signature and server load level decides one of the following actions to be taken against suspected user; no blocking and delay, delay suspicious clients or block suspicious clients. An occasional use of AHAY will delay attack detection and its frequent use will discomfort the client. Ni et al. (2013) proposed a detection mechanism based on entropy of HTTP GET requests per source IP. It utilised the fact that the source IP clusters are more distributed in case of a flash crowd as compared to a DDoS attack. It can differentiate flash crowd from possible apDDoS attacks. Kalman filter is used to model various time dependent parameters associated with adaptive autoregressive model. The HTTP GET requests are classified using state vector machine (SVM) trained by adaptive auto regressive (AAR) parameters. The adaptive behaviour of the system allows the detection mechanism to work even in case of varying traffic conditions. Wang et al. (2013) extended their previous work (Wang et al., 2011) to support the modelling of legitimate behaviour even from noisy datasets i.e., web traces mixed with traffic from web bots. The authors use density-based clustering to identify web crawler traces in the training dataset. Anomaly-based detection system set out in the present work characterises the normal user browsing behaviour in terms of session length and varying web page popularity. Giralte et al. (2013) represented the legitimate user behaviour in terms of layer 4 and layer 7 parameters such as number of GET requests, GETs mean, mean of flows per user, standard deviation of flows per user, etc. A three-stage model was designed to detect a variety of apDDoS attacks wherein each stage was able to capture some of the attacks. The proposed scheme is able to distinguish legitimate and spurious web bots based on their access path patterns. Xie et al. (2013a) proposed HsMM-based detection scheme for the attacks being redirected to the victim server by the use of web proxies. The authors identified the dominant/visible (arrival rate, temporal locality, packet size) and recessive/invisible (type, motivation, formation) features of proxy-to-server aggregated traffic. Traffic directed toward the server is compared against this model to determine the judgment index that will be used for service acceptance or rejection decisions. Xie et al. (2013b) proposed a scheme that primarily detects web proxy-based DDoS attacks using hidden semi Markov model. The authors captured temporal and spatial localities to model web proxies' access behaviour using the server logs. The scheme offers traffic intensity and web content independent defence approach against proxy-based attacks. However, with the increase in number of users, this detection model is likely to give expensive results. Chwalinski et al. (2013a Chwalinski et al. ( , 2013b proposed two detection methods using entropy-based clustering. The former distinguishes normal and attack behaviour using Bayes factor whereas the latter use likelihood analysis. Both the works extracted attributes related to the popularity of web pages to model normal legitimate behaviour. The proposed detection mechanism is expected to fail in identifying an apDDoS attack during a flash crowd.
The popularity of a large website varies with time, as contents are periodically updated and deleted. Wang et al. (2014) proposed a dynamic popularity-based DDoS detection scheme based on their previous work (Wang et al., 2011) . Large deviation principle characterises the difference in expected and actual popularity of web pages. The proposed system efficiently detects random and perfect knowledge DDoS attacks but is inadequate in defending single and multi DDoS URL attacks. Zhou et al. (2014) extended the work by Wen et al. (2010) to sustain under heavy backbone traffic conditions. To implement live detection, they used a real time frequency vector based on target's resource requests. The attack detection module triggers in case of an anomaly detected by the front-end sensor. This reduces the load caused by frequent computations. Mess extent differentiates flash crowd from various possible apDDoS attacks. Xu et al. (2014) proposed a scheme to detect asymmetric apDDoS attacks. They captured user browsing sequence patterns based on extended random walk model. The proposed scheme predicts the possible future request sequence for a user based on the legitimate request sequence model. The scheme is able to identify individual attacker based on its deviation from the expected behaviour. However, its restrained ability in detecting attacks based on high workload requests only makes it vulnerable to other type of apDDoS attacks. Liao et al. (2015) proposed machine learning-based detection technique that used a support vector machine to identify presence of any attacks. The similarity among access patterns of bots is measured using the request frequency sequence feature. Subsequently, the rhythm-matching algorithm is applied to identify similar patterns. New and stealthy bots can easily evade such similarity-based detection techniques. Xiao et al. (2015) proposed a detection technique based on the property that the flows generated by bots are likely to be correlated with each other. K-nearest neighbours algorithm is used to identify flows that may have occurred from same software or bots. Depending on this similarity among flows, the spurious access patterns were identified. Relying only on similarity of flows does not always guarantee optimum detection accuracy. Yadav and Selvakumar (2015) proposed a logistic regression-based detection technique to classify legitimate and anomalous users. A total number of 17 different traffic features (nine constructed features and eight extracted features) are utilised to construct a model that is used in the detection process. This technique detects three types of apDDoS attacks: request flooding, session flooding and asymmetric flooding.
Web server architecture
A web server is a class of systems employed to process and deliver web pages against the clients' requests. The web server is responsible to deliver continuous services to their clients. Apache, nginx and IIS are some of the most popular web servers in the market today (Netcraft, 2015) . Over the years, a number of different web servers have been developed with vast architectural variations.
Irrespective of the variations, typical web server architecture contains two queues: socket queue and request queue, as shown in Figure 2 . The socket queue holds all the incoming TCP connection requests. When the server reaches its maximum simultaneous connection limit, the subsequent connection requests get lined up in the socket queue until the server's availability. Lower layer DDoS attack like SYN flood overwhelms the socket queue by sending SYN requests to the server at a very high rate. The incoming requests may it be spurious or legitimate get dropped once the socket queue becomes full. This causes a denial of service to the future requests received by the server. The thread allocated by the server to each successful connection is responsible to handle and process the incoming service requests from that connection. After successfully establishing a TCP connection, the client requests are added to the request queue of the server from which the corresponding thread executes the requests. During an attack, the high rate requests generated by bots quickly fill up the request queue that stalls the subsequent incoming requests. This thwarts the communication between legitimate clients and the server, thus causing a denial of service. 
Simulation setup
We carry our simulation studies in Network Simulator 2. NS2 is widely used as an open source event-driven simulator by various research communities. It has many integrated modules to simulate the working of actual networks. To create the attack and legitimate request traffic, we use Webtraf module defined in NS2. The traffic generation parameters for clients and attackers are attuned to produce workload closely resembling the real world environment.
We set up a simple dumbbell topology with 200 clients and a single target web server. The connection between the two ends (clients and the server) acts as the bottleneck link as shown in Figure 3 . The bandwidth of the bottleneck link and all other links is 10 Mbps and 100 Mbps respectively. The attack amplitude does not exceed the bottleneck link bandwidth resulting in minimum or no network level packet drops. Though all the traffic flowing between clients and the server passes this bottleneck link, we are primarily concerned with the application level parameters, as a well-organised apDDoS attack will avoid its detection at lower layers by mimicking as a legitimate user. The lower layer detection metrics are not very effective in identifying higher layer anomalies as they mainly focus on packet level details. 10% of all clients are responsible to launch the attack. Other 180 legitimate clients initiate their respective communications with the server immediately after beginning of the simulation. The attack launches at 1,000th second for the duration of 150 seconds i.e. from 1,000th to 1,150th second. To effectively measure the impact of an apDDoS attack, we modified the core of Webtraf module in NS2 to simulate both legitimate and attack traffic. Table 1 and Table 2 shows the parameters used in this simulation study. We select the simulation parameters considering the work done by Camps et al. (2008) , Guo and Matta (2001) , Joo et al. (2001) and Vishwanath et al. (2009) . 
Results and analysis
The simulation uses WebServer module to simulate the working of a typical web server. Different attacks are launched based on the inter-session intervals (the delay between initiations of two sessions). We simulate a high rate apDDoS attack with three different session interval times i.e. 0.9, 0.05 and 0.03. The rate at which requests are generated increases rapidly during the attack. The bots tend to create newer sessions after short intervals (see Figure 4) . The average rate of requests generated by the legitimate clients remains close to 100 in comparison to the rates of 1,100, 2,100 and 3,200 for the attack session intervals of 0.09, 0.05 and 0.03 respectively. The effect of different intensity attacks on the performance metrics is shown in Figure 5 . The number of failed transactions increases with the increase in attack intensity as depicted in Figure 5 (a). We consider two cases of transaction failure i.e., request timeout and request drop. The ratio of request drop to request timeout is large i.e. the number of requests dropped were very large as compared to the number of request timeouts. This is because after a request has entered the queue, timeout will occur only if the server fails to respond in a stipulated time that is the case only during a congested queue. Whereas, once the queue becomes full, all the incoming requests are dropped in case of a high request rate attack. With increasing attack intensity, the probability of request drop also soars. During an attack, the queue reaches its full capacity. Whenever a legitimate request successfully enters the queue, it is scheduled for processing only after completion of all its preceding requests. With the increase in attack amplitude, the average latency consequently increases as shown in Figure 5 (b). The server load indicates status of the request queue. Figure 5 (c) represents the choked request queue during the attack phase. The attack effect is recognised even after the actual attack duration. It is because the sessions created during the final phase of the attack persist even after its termination. Higher the strength, longer the attack impression lasts on the server as reflected by all the metrics in Figure 5 . The processing rate of a server signifies the maximum number of requests it can simultaneously process. During an attack, the request rate dominates the processing rate of a server. The first phase of simulation is performed using two discrete processing rates 80 and 150 together with varying request queue sizes of 800 and 1,200. The effect of different server parameters on predefined performance metrics is summarised in Table 3 . During an apDDoS attack, either the serving capacity of a web server is increased or the attack traffic is filtered after its successful characterisation. We create multiple simulation scenarios with varying processing rates and queue lengths. Providing higher capabilities to the server resulted in the reduction of average latency and total failed transactions, as indicated by Figure 7 and Figure 8 . We observe that the average latency of transactions decreases with shorter queue length because of the reduced time that a transaction needs to spend in a queue.
Meanwhile, more requests are discarded when the queue is full, thus, increasing the rate of dropped transactions. Although the processing rate tries to counter the impact of low rate DDoS attacks, it is still ineffective in confronting high rate attacks generated by the modern-day attackers. Therefore, providing higher serving potential to a server will only work under limited attack scenarios. Detecting and further mitigating the attack traffic should be the ultimate goal of an employed defence framework. Table 3 Simulation results
Simulation parameters
Performance metrics 
Network layer attributes
Network and transport level parameters are insufficient in effectively detecting apDDoS attacks. Attributes associated with the application layer are thereby necessary to detect these attacks. To demonstrate this, along with some application layer performance metrics computed above, we also measure four lower layer metrics:
1 Packet delivery ratio: This defines the ratio of the amount of packets received by the destination to the total number of packets from all the clients. This value becomes important in case of high volumetric attacks where it tends to reach below one i.e., there are packet drops in the network.
Packets received
Packets sent ∑ ∑
2 End-to-end delay: It is the average of the total time taken by packets from a particular source to reach the destination. This delay value rises due to congestion in a network during a flooding-based attack.
Number of packets n
3 Average queuing delay: The packets from multiple sources aggregate at the bottleneck link. This results in increasing queuing delay. The rise in packets being queued on this link also causes various delays and drops.
.
Queuing delay
No of packets ∑
4 Average packet rate: This value represents the average of the number of packets generated by clients every second. During a high rate attack, this value reaches beyond the handling capabilities of the victim.
Packets generated by each client
No of clients ∑ Table 4 shows estimates of lower layer parameters during apDDoS attack of different strengths. It is evident from the results shown in Table 4 that these metrics alone are not able to effectively detect an apDDoS attack due to its elusive deviation from the normal behaviour. Figure 6 shows the queue status of the bottleneck link before and after the initiation of the attack. Two consecutive snapshots of the queue status differ in 30 intervals i.e., a new snapshot is taken after every 30th packet inserted in the queue. It clearly shows that during an attack, the queue fills up quickly with packets from the attacking nodes. However, no packet drop is witnessed as apDDoS attack can achieve an equivalent impact without creating such enormous traffic. Similar to the above queue, web server's request queue when under such attack gets busy in serving more of the spurious requests as compared to legitimate ones, thereby affecting the availability of services to the legitimate users.
apDDoS attack strategies
Besides high rate apDDoS attacks, we measure the effect of pulsating, asymmetric and slowly increasing apDDoS attacks in the second phase of simulation using the performance metrics discussed above. These attacks unlike the high request rate attacks discern complex detection efforts due to their stealthy nature. The attackers put into operation a number of variations of apDDoS attacks to evade detection mechanisms implemented by the victim. The damage caused by such different attack strategies is equivalent to that of the traditional high rate apDDoS attack. Three commonly employed apDDoS attack strategies are:
• Pulsating apDDoS attack: The request rate periodically escalates for short time intervals. These intervals can be regular or irregular depending on the attacker's strategy. The average request rate in this case does not exceed a certain threshold, thus evading the detection.
• Asymmetric apDDoS attack: The requests generated by the attacker usually request the contents that will incur a high workload on the server. Therefore, the server gets overloaded with even fewer number of requests.
• Slowly increasing apDDoS attack: Starting at a low pace, the overall request rate at the server gradually increases. This makes it difficult for the detection mechanism to discriminate between the attack and legitimate traffic.
We measured the impact of pulsating, slowly increasing and asymmetric apDDoS attacks on the pre-defined performance metrics. In pulsating apDDoS attack, short pulses of high requests are generated for small time intervals due to which the attack surpasses the detection radar of many defence schemes. During a pulsating apDDoS attack, the total no. of failed transactions increases in the form of steps as shown in Figure 9 (d) due to high request peaks generated during those time intervals. Influence of this form of attack on other metrics is shown in Figure 9 . Asymmetric apDDoS attacks on the other hand requests large sized objects but at a normal rate, making it difficult to identify attacks based on request semantics. Asymmetric apDDoS attacks can cause a great amount of damage with far less number of requests as shown in Figure 10 (a). The server gets absorbed in processing of the large sized requests due to which a sharp increase in total failed transactions is noticed, as shown in Figure 10 (d). The effect of this kind of attack strategy on other performance metrics is presented in Figure 10 . Slowly increasing apDDoS attacks are considered as the most well-organised and dangerous as these can deceive many state-of-the-art defence mechanisms. The request rate increases very slowly with time as seen in Figure 11 (a). Detection schemes relying on users' request dynamics are unable to detect such attacks early. The resultant effect of this attack strategy on the server is shown in Figure 11 . 
Conclusions and future research avenues
In this work, we evaluate the impact of apDDoS attacks on a traditional web server. In a process to simulate realistic legitimate traffic and attack workloads, we modified the Webtraf module in NS2. The attack impact on legitimate clients is measured using a set of predefined application-layer performance metrics. The results obtained from the simulation indicated the need for real-time defence against such attacks to continue uninterrupted services for the legitimate users. Our simulation results have shown the effect of various other forms of apDDoS attack along-with varying processing rates and queue lengths on the service. Many bot detection mechanisms are found to be deficient against such attacks as these can mimic legitimate user browsing behaviour. The results also pinpointed the limited capability of the lower layer metrics in detecting these new and sophisticated attacks. As the companies are utilising on the extent of the internet for progressively offering services to their users, it is expected that the modern-day DDoS attacks will be targeting the security imperfections of those individual services.
It is also important to mention that the research community lacks the availability of real-world apDDoS attack. This has made it essential for the researchers in this field to manually fabricate the application-layer attack workloads. Constructing an apDDoS attack dataset can therefore act as a prospect for future research. This will allow the researchers to conduct an effective and comprehensive assessment of their detection techniques.
